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Abstract 
Robust technological enforcement of DRM licenses 
assumes that the prevention of direct access to the raw bit 
representation of decrypted digital content and the license 
enforcement mechanisms themselves is possible. This is 
difficult to achieve on an open computing platform such 
as a PC. Recent trusted computing initiatives namely, the 
Trusted Computing Group (TCG) specification, and 
Microsoft’s Next Generation Secure Computing Base 
(NGSCB) aim in part to address this problem. The 
protection architecture and access control model of 
mainstream operating systems makes them inappropriate 
as a platform for a DRM content rendering client because 
decrypted content cannot be protected against a privileged 
process. If a DRM client is to be deployed on an open 
computing platform, the operating system should 
implement the reference monitor concept, which 
underpins the mandatory access control model. The TCG 
model of trusted computing has important limitations 
when combined with an operating system enforcing 
discretionary access control. We argue that the TCG 
services of sealed storage and remote attestation which 
are important in DRM applications, cannot operate in a 
secure and efficient manner on such an operating system. .  
1 Introduction 
Advances in digital compression technology coupled with 
the reduced cost and increased capacity of storage media 
and network bandwidth have combined to make the 
distribution of digital content over the Internet a practical 
reality. The owners of copyrighted works, particularly in 
the entertainment area, have become increasingly anxious 
to ensure that evolving digital technology does not limit 
or reduce their capacity to enforce their copyrights for 
financial reward. This concern has motivated a steadily 
growing interest in the field of Digital Rights 
Management (DRM). 
DRM has been defined as “the management of rights to 
digital goods and content, including its confinement to 
authorized use and users and the management of any 
consequences of that use throughout the entire life cycle 
of the content” (CEN/ISSS, 2003). 
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This definition encompasses two distinct aspects of DRM 
that are independently recognised as being worthy of 
protection in the World Intellectual Property 
Organisation’s copyright treaty (WIPO, 1996): firstly, 
rights management information, which includes 
“information which identifies the work, the author of the 
work, the owner of any right in the work, or information 
about the terms and conditions of use of the work”, and 
secondly, technological enforcement, which encompasses 
effective technological mechanisms used to enforce the 
terms and conditions of use for a work. 
Although these two aspects of DRM cannot be cleanly 
separated, it is the second aspect that is the principle 
focus of this paper. In particular, we consider the difficult 
challenge of technological enforcement on open 
computing platforms such as a general purpose personal 
computer (PC).  
The essential premise of DRM is that a rights owner 
wishes to license digital content (which is represented as 
binary digits or bits) to a licensee or customer who agrees 
to be bound by the terms of the license. Note that the 
customer is not buying the bits themselves. Rather, they 
are buying the right to use the bits in a defined and 
restricted manner, as authorised in the terms of the 
license. Hence the license defines a type of usage policy. 
A hypothetical license might authorise a single playing of 
the content on a nominated platform. Copying, multiple 
‘plays’, redistribution and modification may be 
prohibited. Technological enforcement is necessary 
because the rights owner does not necessarily trust the 
customer, yet they would like to have a reasonable level 
of assurance that the license terms will be complied with 
even though the content is stored and used on devices that 
they do not own or control.  Digital information can be 
protected from unauthorised access in transit and storage 
by well-understood cryptographic techniques. As 
Schneck (1999) argues, the more complicated challenge 
presented by DRM flows from the observation that the 
content bits must be in the clear (i.e., not protected by 
encryption) on the client platform in order to be rendered 
in a manner perceptible to a user. If the decrypted content 
bits can be accessed, (for example by using a kernel 
debugger or modified device driver) the technological 
enforcement of the license conditions can be 
circumvented. Once dissociated from its protection, the 
content can be freely copied, played, modified and 
redistributed, albeit in violation of the license terms.  
Consequently, to reliably enforce typical DRM policies, it 
must not be possible for the platform user to access the 
plaintext bits that represent the content, despite the 
practical reality that the platform is under the user’s direct 
control1. This is an access control problem that cannot be 
solved purely by cryptography. On open computing 
platforms that can run arbitrary software, it is a difficult 
problem to which there is currently no practical, deployed 
solution, particularly in terms of ‘software-only’  
techniques. Recent trusted computing initiatives, namely 
Microsoft’ s Next Generation Secure Computing Base 
(NGSCB) (Microsoft, 2004) and the Trusted Computing 
Group (TCG) specification, (Trusted Computing Group, 
2003) formerly known as TCPA aim in part, to address 
this issue through both hardware and software based 
methods (Anderson, 2003).  
The goal of trusted computing is to deliver systems that 
are highly resistant to subversion by malicious 
adversaries, allowing them to operate reliably and 
predictably in almost any circumstance. Trusted 
computing is an important ingredient in DRM because it 
provides a sound basis for license enforcement.  Given 
the way the NGSCB and TCG initiatives have been 
promoted, one could be forgiven for thinking that trusted 
computing is an entirely new concept. As we discuss in 
Section 3.1, trusted computing actually has a long history 
but the lessons this history can teach have been largely 
ignored over the last 20 years, particularly in the design 
of mainstream PC operating systems2. As a consequence, 
such systems are fundamentally ill equipped to provide 
the level of protection that a robust DRM system 
demands.   
1.1 Contribution 
In this paper we explain in detail why mainstream, 
commercial grade operating systems are an inappropriate 
platform on which to base a DRM client. We clarify why 
DRM platforms require an operating system that can 
enforce mandatory access control. We aim to address 
common misunderstandings as to the extent to which the 
TCG specification implements DRM. A key conclusion 
of our analysis is that the addition of TCG components to 
a discretionary access control enforcing operating system 
does not result in a ‘trusted system’  that can reliably 
enforce DRM licenses.  We identify problems with DRM 
related applications of the TCG sealed storage feature that 
flow from the non-deterministic order of execution of a 
multi-tasking operating system. We highlight issues that 
undermine the effectiveness of the TCG remote 
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 We adopt the term mainstream operating system to refer 
to popular commercial operating systems such as 
Windows 95, NT, 2000 and XP from Microsoft Inc. 
(USA), Linux from various distributions of this open 
source system and various versions of Unix that 
implement a discretionary access control policy.  
attestation feature when it is deployed on mainstream 
operating systems. 
1.2 Overview  
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. 
Section 2 provides background on the relevance of trusted 
systems to DRM. Section 3 examines operating system 
properties that are necessary to support secure DRM 
client applications, highlighting the deficiency of 
mainstream operating systems in relation to these 
requirements. Section 4 presents an analysis of the TCG 
specification and the degree to which it can improve the 
trustworthiness of mainstream operating systems. Section 
5 examines Microsoft’ s NGSCB initiative and Section 6 
provides conclusions to this analysis. 
2 DRM Client Security and Trusted Systems 
Stefik (1997) argues that trusted systems are a basic 
requirement for robust DRM. Stefik defines a trusted 
system as one “that can be relied on to follow certain 
rules. In the context of digital works, a trusted system 
follows rules governing the terms, conditions and fees for 
using digital works.” The rules or license terms are 
expressed in a computer-interpretable format, (known as 
a rights expression language) and the content rendering 
client ensures that the content is protected and 
manipulated in a manner consistent with the rules. Stefik 
does not describe the properties a trusted system should 
have to reliably enforce the rules. However it is implicit 
from the functional description that the trusted system 
must protect the underlying bit representation of the 
content from direct access by a user. If this were not the 
case, bypassing rule enforcement would be trivial. 
According to Lacy et al. (1997), the license interpretation 
and enforcement components of the client’ s content 
rendering platform, (which we will refer to as the DRM 
client) must be implemented within the boundaries of a 
Trusted Computing Base (TCB). Lacy does not consider 
the complications that are introduced if the DRM client is 
an open computing device capable of running arbitrary 
software.  
Biddle et al. (2003) identify the following necessary 
enforcement properties for a DRM client: 
1. The client cannot remove the encryption from 
the file and send it to a peer. 
2. The client cannot ‘clone’ its DRM system to 
make it run on another host. 
3. The client obeys the rules set out in the DRM 
license. 
4. The client cannot separate the rules from the 
payload. 
When the DRM client is implemented in application 
software on a mainstream operating system, Hauser and 
Wenz (2003) contend that policy enforcement can be 
bypassed with relative ease. They document a number of 
successful attacks on deployed schemes. Properties 1, 3 
and 4 are particularly difficult to implement in application 
level clients that run on mainstream operating systems. In 
the next section we discuss reasons for the inadequacy of 
application level policy enforcement, in the absence of 
certain operating system features. 
3 DRM, Trusted Systems and Mandatory 
Access Control 
This section examines the relationship between operating 
system architecture and the effectiveness of DRM license 
enforcement.  
According to Loscocco et al., (1998) “current security 
efforts suffer from the flawed assumption that adequate 
security can be provided in applications with the existing 
security mechanisms of mainstream operating systems.” 
They identify two important operating system 
mechanisms that are necessary for effective application-
level security policy enforcement: firstly the ability to 
enforce a mandatory security policy; and secondly, a 
trusted path for user input and output. Since neither 
property is implemented in current mainstream operating 
systems they argue that the security of applications based 
thereon can be nothing more than “a fortress built on 
sand”. This contention is certainly consistent with the 
results reported by Hauser and Wenz (2003). 
The terms mandatory security policy and Mandatory 
Access Control (MAC) are used in a broader sense than 
their more common association with Multi-Level Security 
(MLS) systems that are based on the work of Bell and La 
Padula (1973). As Loscocco et al. (1998) describe, a 
system must be capable of enforcing a defined security 
policy in a mandatory fashion. This means that policy 
enforcement must be assured. To achieve mandatory 
security, security policy must be established, configured 
and maintained by an authorised security policy 
administrator (as opposed to Discretionary Access 
Control (DAC) systems, which allow ordinary users to 
configure access policy). The policy may be expressed in 
MLS terms or it may be role based3 or it may be based on 
Domain and Type enforcement (DTE)4. The key 
requirement is that the operating system and underlying 
hardware are designed so that it is not possible for 
software or users to reconfigure or subvert the 
enforcement of the policy. Loscocco et al., argue that 
carefully controlled memory segregation is critically 
important in achieving this requirement. When it is 
attained, mutually distrustful applications are able to 
execute on the same platform without being able to 
access each other's resources (if the policy does not allow 
it). This is a crucial requirement for DRM clients if 
Biddle’ s enforcement properties, as described in Section 
2, are to be met. 
3.1 Architecture Flaws in Mainstream OSs 
A key limitation of mainstream operating systems that 
renders them inappropriate as platforms for a DRM client 
is their enforcement of an identity based discretionary 
security policy rather than a mandatory security policy. 
The DAC model is incompatible with the trust 
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relationship that exists between a content provider and a 
content consumer, who is not assumed to be trustworthy. 
Since content is locally rendered, the content provider is 
forced to rely on the customer’ s DRM client to enforce 
their license terms but the environment that this client 
operates in is under the customer’ s control. In a DAC 
system, control of the execution environment gives the 
customer the ability to subvert the policy enforcement 
mechanisms of their DRM client5. The system owner can 
run privileged software such as a modified device driver 
that is able to access the memory space of the DRM 
client6. In a MAC system based for example on DTE, it is 
possible to configure the MAC policy so that the DRM 
client’ s memory space cannot be accessed, even by other 
parts of the operating system. If the content provider can 
evaluate the MAC policy configuration to confirm that it 
enforces DRM client isolation, they can establish a 
degree of trust in the DRM client’ s ability to enforce the 
license terms – on the grounds that the application’ s 
technological enforcement measures cannot be tampered 
with or bypassed and its address space cannot be snooped 
by other privileged processes to copy decrypted content 
bits.  
A MAC capability provides a sound basis for policy 
enforcement through rigorous control over information 
flows between subjects and objects (see Badger et al., 
1995). MAC systems rely on the concept of a reference 
monitor, (Anderson, 1972) which is responsible for 
enforcing the policy. The reference monitor mediates 
every access to system resources and data, (collectively 
known as objects) deciding whether the requested access 
is consistent with the policy. To ensure that every access 
is mediated, it must not be possible to bypass the 
reference monitor. The reference monitor mechanism also 
needs to be protected against tampering to ensure that an 
attacker cannot subvert or influence its access decisions. 
Finally, the reference monitor needs to be small enough 
to allow it to be validated via analysis and testing. These 
properties can be achieved by software in concert with 
hardware protection mechanisms (Schell et al., 1985). 
The totality of software and hardware that is responsible 
for enforcing the security policy is known as the Trusted 
Computing Base (TCB). 
A further critical weakness in mainstream operating 
systems is their inability to implement the security 
principle of least privilege, described for example, by 
Saltzer and Schroeder (1975). As the name suggests, least 
privilege requires a program or user to be given only the 
minimum set of access rights necessary to complete a 
task.  To achieve this, a system needs to be able to 
express and enforce fine-grained access rights.  In today’ s 
mainstream operating systems, privileges are bound to so 
called user ‘IDs’  so access decisions are based on user 
identity.  As a consequence, all of a user’ s privileges are 
granted to each program running on behalf of that user. 
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 TCG integrity measurement capabilities do not 
effectively address this problem. See Section 4.3 
There is no efficient mechanism to reduce the set of 
available privileges to those that are actually needed.  
To make matters worse mainstream operating systems 
have only two major categories of users:  the root or 
super-user, and normal users.  As the name ‘super-user’  
implies, processes with super-user privilege cannot be 
constrained by access controls as there is no reference 
monitor. This operating system architecture creates a 
serious problem for DRM applications, because the 
platform owner typically has access to the super-user 
account. Without access controls, a DRM license cannot 
be enforced against the super-user and plaintext content 
bits cannot be reliably protected. Observance of the 
principle of least privilege and enforcement of MAC 
underpin effective domain confinement through reliable 
control over information flows within the operating 
system (Saltzer and Schroeder, 1975). A DRM client 
based on an open computing platform cannot successfully 
maintain Biddle’ s minimum enforcement properties, 
(listed in Section 2) without the confinement and 
information flow control that a reference monitor enables.  
Device drivers in mainstream operating systems present a 
particular problem because they must be totally trusted 
but they are not necessarily trustworthy.  Drivers are 
tailored to a specific piece of hardware (e.g., a particular 
sound or graphics card) so they are normally provided by 
the hardware vendor.  This creates a problem of trust. 
Solomon and Russinovich (2000) note: “ device driver 
code has complete access to system memory space and 
can bypass Windows 2000 security to access objects.”  So 
device driver code is like application code in that it is 
supplied by a range of sources. But it is effectively 
operating system code since it has unrestricted access to 
system resources. To further complicate matters, device 
drivers can be dynamically loaded at runtime. Thus, a 
malicious or buggy driver can be used for example, to 
compromise cryptographic keys and the plaintext of 
protected content. A digitally signed driver provided by a 
trusted vendor is a common approach to combat this 
problem. Unfortunately this offers only a partial solution 
because drivers are typically too large and complex to 
evaluate to attain a reasonable degree of assurance that 
they do not contain exploitable bugs or unexpected 
behaviours. A signature does not guarantee correct 
operation. It is also difficult to ensure that the integrity of 
the signature verification mechanism and signer’ s public 
key are protected.  
Early trusted systems such as Multics, (Corbato et al. 
1972) addressed the device driver trust issue via a 
hierarchy of hardware enforced execution domains 
known as rings. Building on the Multics approach, Intel 
x86 processors have supported a ring based protection 
architecture (Figure 1) since the 286 chip.  This four level 
design, with ring 0 being the most privileged and ring 3 
the least, is intended to allow the operating system kernel, 
(which implements the reference monitor) to operate at a 
higher level of hardware enforced privilege than device 
drivers, other operating system components and code 
libraries which in turn can have higher privilege than 
users and application processes. The higher level of 
privilege ensures that the reference monitor mechanism is 
more resistant to bypass or tampering by other less 
trusted processes running in rings of lesser privilege. The 
quantity and complexity of code that must be trusted to 
enforce the mandatory security policy is thereby 
substantially reduced. This makes it easier to establish 
confidence in its correctness. The x86 hardware 
architecture is capable of supporting highly secure and 
trustworthy operation. When correctly utilised, its ring-
based architecture combined with its fine-grained 
memory segmentation allow it to enforce effective 
domain separation and confinement at the hardware level.  
Unfortunately, with rare exceptions, (e.g. the GEMSOS 
OS described in Schell et al. (1985)) the protection rings 
and memory segmentation/capability features of the Intel 
x86 have not been used by mainstream, general purpose 
operating system designers as they were intended.  
Mainstream operating systems use only the most and least 
privileged rings for system and user space respectively, 
emulating two state machines.  While PC operating 
systems may not have been designed with security as a 
high priority, the same cannot be said of the processor on 
which they are based. 
 
Figure 1: The Intel x86 Ring Architecture 
The failure of mainstream operating systems to correctly 
utilise the ring structure of the x86 processor explains 
Intel’ s announced intention to release a new chip with 
what is effectively a ‘ring –1’ . According to Peinado, et 
al., (2004) the reason for this is that Microsoft’ s new 
NGSCB trusted computing architecture requires a higher 
level of privilege to enable effective domain separation 
within ring 0 which, for reasons of backward 
compatibility must continue to host device drivers of 
questionable provenance and other potentially insecure 
operating system components.  This is discussed in more 
detail in Section 5.  
In summary, mainstream operating systems lack the 
essential features that are required to protect decrypted 
content and thereby support the enforcement of DRM 
licenses.  They do not enforce a mandatory access policy, 
and they fail to observe the principle of least privilege, 
which greatly magnifies the threat presented by software 
bugs and privileged but malicious code.  In addition, the 
sheer volume and complexity of privileged code, 
(including device drivers) means that there is no 
possibility of gaining any reasonable level of assurance 
that a platform will obey DRM license terms. Trust 
mechanisms based on signed code and drivers do not alter 
this situation since the problem flows from the access 
control model and operating system architecture. 
4 Trusted Computing Group - formerly TCPA 
In response to myriad problems created by the insecurity 
of open computing platforms, the Trusted Computing 
Group (TCG) has proposed a trusted computing platform 
specification (Trusted Computing Group 2003). In this 
section we briefly describe key aspects of the 
specification. In the context of a DRM client application, 
we analyse the operating system features that are 
necessary to make meaningful use of TCG services, 
particularly remote attestation and sealed storage. 
The Trusted Computing Group (TCG), successor to the 
Trusted Computing Platform Alliance (TCPA), is an 
initiative led by AMD, Hewlett-Packard, IBM, Intel, 
Microsoft, Sony, and Sun Microsystems.  The TCG aims 
to “ develop and promote open, vendor-neutral, industry 
standard specifications for trusted computing building 
blocks and software interfaces across multiple 
platforms” 7.  
The novelty of the TCG architecture lies in the range of 
entities that are able to use TCG features as a basis for 
trust.  These include not only the platform user and owner 
but also, remote entities wishing to interact with the 
platform.  The mechanism of remote attestation allows 
remote third parties to challenge a platform to report 
details of its current software state.  On the basis of the 
attestation, third parties can decide whether they consider 
the platform’ s configuration to be trustworthy. If 
correctly implemented, remote attestation promises to be 
an important feature for DRM clients on open platforms 
since it may assist a content provider in deciding whether 
the client is currently configured to enforce the license 
terms reliably before the content is actually provided.  
A closely related TCG objective is to provide reliable, 
hardware-based protection for secrets such as 
cryptographic keys.  Since open computing platforms can 
run arbitrary software, this objective aims to ensure that 
protected secrets will not be revealed unless the 
platform’ s software state meets clearly defined and 
accurately measurable criteria. TCG’ s sealed storage 
feature can be used to bind a protected secret such as a 
content decryption key to a particular software 
configuration. If the configuration is not as specified, the 
sealed key will not be released. 
4.1 TCG Architectural Modifications 
The architectural modifications required by the TCG 
specification include the addition of a cryptographic 
processor called a Trusted Platform Module (TPM). The 
TPM must be a fixed part of the computing device that 
cannot (easily) be transferred to another platform.  The 
TPM provides a range of cryptographic primitives 
including random number generation, SHA-1 hashing, 
asymmetric encryption and decryption, signing and 
verification using 2048 bit RSA, and asymmetric key pair 
generation8. There is also a small amount of protected key 
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storage. Currently available TPMs are based on smart 
card processors. 
4.2 Integrity Measurement and Reporting 
The TCG security services of remote attestation and 
sealed storage build on an integrity protected boot 
technique that was introduced by Arbaugh et al. (1997). 
Integrity protected booting is fundamental to the design 
of the TCG architecture.  Figure 2 illustrates the process 
with numbers in parentheses denoting the sequence of 
events.  
 
Figure 2: TCG Integrity Protected Boot Sequence 
The boot process starts in a defined state with execution 
of the BIOS ‘boot block’  code.  The BIOS boot block is 
called the Core Root of Trust for Measurement (CRTM). 
Since it initiates the booting and measurement process, it 
is implicitly trusted.  The core idea behind integrity 
protected booting is that a precise hash-based 
measurement or fingerprint of all executable code in the 
boot chain should be taken and securely stored 
immediately before that code is given control of the 
processor.  Accordingly, the CRTM takes a hash of the 
BIOS code (1) and stores the value in a protected 
hardware register in the TPM (2), called a Platform 
Configuration Register (PCR). PCRs cannot be deleted or 
arbitrarily overwritten within a boot cycle.  They are 
‘update only’  using a simple chained hash technique, 
based on the SHA1 secure hash algorithm that works as 
follows (where || denotes concatenation):   
Updated PCR Value=Hash(Previous PCR Value || 
Current Measurement To Store) 
This operation is known as extending a PCR. It allows a 
practically unlimited number of measurements to be 
stored or committed in a fixed size register.  
The CRTM then passes control to the BIOS code (3) 
which stores measurements of option ROMS, CPU 
microcode updates and the OS loader before passing 
control to the latter. The boot process continues following 
the same pattern until the kernel is loaded.  If any 
executable stage in this chain has been modified, the 
change will be reflected in the hash value.  Since the 
PCRs can only be extended, not overwritten, the modified 
code cannot hide itself when it is given control of the 
CPU.  
Remote attestation allows a TCG enabled platform to 
assert the state of its current software environment to a 
third party.  The TPM uses a certified key pair that 
identifies the platform as a genuine TCG platform, to sign 
the current PCR values.  Figure 3 illustrates the 
attestation procedure in a DRM setting.  Before 
delivering protected content a content provider can 
challenge a requesting TCG platform to attest on its 
current configuration. The platform sends the signed 
PCRs together with a log containing each of the 
individual measurements that have been extended into the 
PCR hash chains. The provider reviews each individual 
measurement to ensure that it corresponds to a component 
that it considers ‘trusted’ . If satisfied with the platform’ s 
state, the content can be delivered. 
 
Figure 3: TCG Remote Attestation Protocol 
4.3 Operating System Support for TCG 
Trusted Computing 
In this section we examine the types of operating system 
support that are necessary to meaningfully make use of 
remote attestation and sealed storage features. We 
highlight a number of serious challenges in applying TCG 
concepts of trusted computing to mainstream operating 
systems.  
The TCG specification is claimed to be operating system 
neutral. It defines lowest common denominator 
functionality for a range of platform types including 
PDAs, mobile phones and PCs. Consequently, it does not 
deal with operating system architecture issues and it does 
not mandate or suggest operating system security features 
necessary for TCG services to work reliably.  The 
specification defines requirements as far as the operating 
system (or bootstrap) loader. Despite the TCG 
specification’ s understandable silence in this regard, we 
contend that a multi-tasking operating system cannot 
meaningfully implement TCG functions, particularly 
remote attestation and sealed storage unless it has the 
‘classical’  trusted computing features that were described 
in Section 3. The TCG’ s integrity verification approach is 
not a substitute for sound operating system architecture.  
To understand why this is so, consider a typical DRM 
content delivery scenario wherein a TCG enabled DRM 
client platform wishes to connect to a content provider to 
download and subsequently view a movie. In exchange 
for payment, the provider will transfer an encrypted copy 
of the movie and a license for a single viewing. The 
license prohibits copying, modification and transfer to 
other platforms. Note that these license terms implicate 
all of Biddle’ s enforcement properties (listed in Section 
2). Building on TCG features, the content provider takes 
a number of steps to ensure the integrity of the policy 
enforcement mechanisms on the client’ s platform. We use 
the term integrity to refer to the ongoing ability of the 
platform to reliably enforce the license terms. There are 
three main types of verification requirement to determine 
and preserve integrity:  
1. The content provider requires client platforms to 
establish via remote attestation that they have 
booted according to TCG principles. The content 
provider assesses the booted software 
environment against a list of ‘trusted’  
components to ensure that the client booted into 
a trusted state.  
2. The content provider must ensure that the client 
has not executed untrusted software after the 
boot process completed but before the remote 
attestation was initiated. 
3. The content provider must ensure that a trusted 
version of the DRM client is executing at the 
time of the remote attestation, and that client 
cannot execute untrusted software while the 
protected content is being accessed or viewed. 
We will now analyse the practical implications of 
addressing these requirements in the context of a 
mainstream operating system.  
The motivation for the first requirement is self-evident. 
However, it is worth emphasizing that the TCG design is 
based on the premise that a system can be trusted if the 
PCR registers match values expected by a relying party. 
The expected values must be those of a known secure 
configuration. This assumes that a secure and trusted 
configuration actually exists and that the configuration is 
trusted because it is trustworthy. As we argued in Section 
3.1, this assumption is not well founded in the case of 
mainstream operating systems because complexity and 
architecture defeat assurance of integrity. TCG does not 
solve code quality or operating system architecture 
problems. This is a critical and often overlooked 
limitation of the TCG model of trusted computing. 
The second and third requirements reflect the fact that the 
integrity of a platform (running a mainstream operating 
system) is dependent on its runtime behaviour.  A 
theoretically trustworthy state immediately post-boot 
provides no guarantee that integrity will maintained, since 
software executing post-boot can affect the integrity of 
the platform.  For example, a dynamically loaded kernel 
module, device driver or privileged application can 
potentially execute at any time and violate protection 
requirements.  As we noted in Section 3.1, this is possible 
because there is no mandatory control over information 
flow among and within processes running at the highest 
level of privilege.   
To support requirements two and three, the operating 
system itself needs to be modified to include a measuring 
function that fingerprints the executable code and 
configuration data of any system or user level process 
before it is launched.  Sailer et al., (2004) propose a 
‘TCG based integrity measurement architecture’  based on 
Linux in which they describe a number of operating 
system modifications to this end.  They describe the 
instrumentation of functions that initiate the loading of 
code and data that may impact platform integrity.  In a 
DAC-based operating system not enforcing the principle 
of least privilege, there are many such places where the 
measuring function must be called.  Relatively simple 
candidates include functions that load kernel modules, 
dynamically loadable libraries, and user-level 
executables.  Other more problematic candidates include 
script interpreters, virtual machines, (e.g., the java class 
loader) privileged applications and network services.  The 
instrumentation itself is relatively simple.  It requires a 
call to a ‘hash and store’  function immediately prior to 
code execution.  The problem lies in the practical 
difficulty of ensuring that all code is instrumented – 
particularly privileged application code.  The source code 
of legacy and proprietary applications is not always 
available and software vendors may not be motivated or 
able to issue instrumented versions of all software that is 
still in use.  Arguably, the impracticality of instrumenting 
all script interpreters, virtual machines, just in time 
compilers, and privileged applications calls into question 
the viability of the whole approach.  The failure to 
instrument results in potential avenues for integrity 
violation.   
The third requirement is the most challenging since it 
requires that the PCR values always reflect the current 
configuration.  Therefore, to be able to verify the integrity 
of any one process all other processes must be measured 
on an ongoing basis (Sailer et al., 2004).  Since the 
integrity of a process may be violated at any moment, an 
attestation is only meaningful at the instant of the last 
measurement.  By the time a challenger has evaluated an 
attestation response, the integrity status may have 
changed in a material way.  The challenger has no way to 
know if this has happened except to continually 
rechallenge the platform, a highly inefficient and 
unsatisfactory option that in any case can only provide 
retrospective assurance. 
This problem also impacts sealed storage.  A platform 
may have been in the configuration mandated in a sealed 
storage policy (as reflected in the required PCR values) at 
the time a protected cryptographic key was released to the 
operating system but this configuration can subsequently 
change (i.e., within the same boot cycle) putting the key 
and decrypted cipher text at risk of compromise.   
In the absence of MAC based domain confinement, what 
is needed is a reliable way for the platform to revoke its 
trusted status and immediately purge any protected 
content or keys from memory if an integrity-relevant 
change occurs.  The insurmountable difficulty lies in 
distinguishing a change that should result in trusted status 
revocation from an integrity preserving one.  The reason 
we consider the problem to be insurmountable relates to 
how unrecognised fingerprints that have been extended 
into PCRs should be handled.  This is discussed in the 
next section. 
4.4 Maintaining Integrity Assurance 
In the TCG remote attestation protocol, the challenged 
platform sends the current PCR values together with a log 
of the individual fingerprints that have been chained 
together to produce these values.  The challenger can use 
the log to determine whether it trusts the components that 
are identified by each individual measurement that makes 
up a hash chain.  To identify any tampering with the log, 
it can recalculate the chain to ensure it produces the 
reported PCR value.  From a challenger’ s perspective, the 
presence of any unrecognised fingerprint in the log 
should result in the platform being considered 
untrustworthy - the unknown fingerprint could be that of 
a malicious component such as a modified device driver 
or a program that provides the same functionality as an 
instrumented program but without the instrumentation, 
e.g. a kernel module loader that can violate the integrity 
of the platform by loading malicious code that will not be 
reflected in the current PCR values.   
This will only present a problem if unrecognised 
fingerprints can be legitimately expected from an 
otherwise ‘trustworthy’  platform.  Unfortunately they are 
highly likely because loosely structured data, (including 
scripting files, configuration files etc.,) must be 
fingerprinted.  This is necessary because the runtime 
behaviour of a program is commonly determined by the 
configuration files it parses at start up, and also, the data 
consumed as inputs once running.  Therefore, to assess 
the integrity impact of executable code, its inputs must be 
measured.  The measurement of semi-structured and 
unstructured input data and configuration files is 
particularly problematic in the context of the TCG 
architecture since they are not as amenable to integrity 
verification via fingerprinting, as is static code.  Non-
executable files of this type can tolerate subtle differences 
such as extra white space characters, comments or the 
same elements in a different order, with no impact on 
integrity.  Nonetheless, any such difference will produce 
a completely different fingerprint.  Differences of this 
type can be reasonably expected in the real world as users 
tailor system behaviour to meet their individual needs via 
configuration files.  Without access to the measured file 
itself, the challenger will be unable to determine whether 
an unrecognised fingerprint results from an irrelevant 
formatting difference in a semi-structured file as opposed 
to a malicious component or an un-instrumented 
component loader.  Hash-based integrity measurement 
may be practical for executable code but it is very 
unforgiving when applied to semi-structured data – 
arguably so unforgiving as to call the whole approach 
into question.   
This line of reasoning applies equally to TCG’ s sealed 
storage feature.  We noted that sealed storage allows the 
release of a protected key to be conditional on the current 
status of PCR registers matching some predefined and 
trusted values.  The presence of an unknown 
measurement in the PCR hash chains will render a sealed 
object inaccessible.  New measurements can be 
introduced by changes in the software or hardware 
configuration (e.g., an upgrade of a video card).   
We believe the use of sealed storage for DRM content 
protection in mainstream operating systems is impractical 
for two reasons.  The first relates to the order PCRs are 
extended in.  With hash chains, the order of element 
chaining determines the resulting output value.  
Therefore, to access a sealed object, all the fingerprints 
that have been extended into a PCR must be trusted and 
they must be chained together in precisely the same order 
that produced the reference PCR values to which the 
object is sealed.  In mainstream operating systems, the 
order of PCR extension is deterministic up to the 
operating system loader.  After this point, order depends 
on individual runtime behaviour as the operating system 
kernel proceeds to launch multiple concurrent processes 
which themselves may be multithreaded.  In such a multi-
tasking environment, execution order is not deterministic.   
The second reason why sealed storage is impractical 
flows from the observation in Section 4.3 that to maintain 
integrity all executable code needs to be measured before 
it is loaded.  This means that PCRs continue to be 
extended as new applications are run.  Therefore, in 
typical usage they do not stabilise to a predetermined 
value9.  This problem could be ameliorated by sealing an 
object to a subset of PCR values that only reflects the 
early stages of the boot process, perhaps up to the loading 
of the operating system kernel.  This would be more 
likely to produce the deterministic result that sealed 
storage requires.  It will not however capture post boot 
platform configuration changes such as the loading of 
kernel modules that can materially impact integrity. 
The impracticality of remote attestation and sealed 
storage on mainstream operating systems is a serious 
drawback.  It underlines the fact that the TCG building 
blocks cannot remedy problems that flow from operating 
system architectural deficiencies.  Secure DRM clients 
cannot be deployed on multi-tasking operating systems 
that are unable to provide isolation and confinement of 
mutually distrustful and potentially hostile processes.  
The application of TCG components does not change this 
fact.  Sailer et al., (2004) assert that “ many of the 
Microsoft NGSCB guarantees can be obtained on today’ s 
hardware and today’ s software and that these guarantees 
do not require a new CPU mode or operating system but 
merely depend on the availability of an independent 
trusted entity, a TPM for example.”  We contend that 
while a number of guarantees may be possible, the 
important ones, (not necessarily delivered by NCSGB 
either) cannot be achieved, since critical elements of a 
trusted system must be enforced by a combination of the 
operating system mapped to CPU hardware-based 
protection structures.  They cannot be provided by add-on 
hardware.   
The addition of TCG components to mainstream 
operating systems does not result in a ‘trusted system’  in 
the traditional sense of the term.  It does not introduce 
trusted paths, or a reference monitor, and it does not alter 
the problems created by the failure to observe the 
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 Version 1.2 of the TCG Specification introduced PCRs 
that can be reset during a boot cycle. 
principle of least privilege.  The TPM allows integrity 
measurements to be stored in a trusted fashion but it does 
not provide any mechanism to prevent integrity 
violations.  It does allow known versions of compromised 
software to be identified by their fingerprints and this is 
definitely useful.  It also provides a more secure 
environment for the storage of cryptographic keys, 
particularly asymmetric signing keys.  However, effective 
domain confinement and mandatory access control are 
fundamental requirements for trusted computing and 
reliable license enforcement in DRM clients.  For these 
reasons we believe that the security benefits gained by 
applying TCG components to mainstream operating 
systems that enforce purely discretionary access control 
are worthwhile but modest. 
TCG components combined with MAC-based operating 
systems such as SELinux (Loscocco, 2001) have 
significant advantages over their DAC based counterparts 
– advantages that may make sealed storage and remote 
attestation considerably more practical.  In a MAC based 
system a challenger needs to verify the integrity of the 
security policy interpretation and enforcement 
mechanism, the policy configuration itself and the DRM 
client application.  If these components are trusted to 
enforce isolation of the DRM client, no further 
measurements are required to establish the ongoing 
integrity of the DRM client.  Thus the impractical 
requirement for ongoing measurement in DAC 
architectures is avoided.  Since integrity assurance is 
based on isolation, detailed measurements of other loaded 
executables and configuration data is not required. 
4.5 Privacy Impacts 
Remote attestation reveals particularly fine-grained 
details of a platform’ s configuration that are likely to be 
sufficient to distinguish different platforms from each 
other and to recognise the same platform across different 
sessions.  In DAC enforcing architectures in particular, 
the privacy protection mechanisms detailed in the TCG 
specification, including the zero-knowledge 
authentication protocols introduced in version 1.2 are at 
great risk of being rendered ineffective.   
5 Next Generation Secure Computing Base 
(NGSCB) formerly Palladium 
‘Next Generation Secure Computing Base’  (NGSCB) is 
the name for Microsoft Inc.’ s trusted computing program, 
formerly known as Palladium.  According to the 
designers of the system Peinado et al., (2004) NGSCB is 
a “ high assurance runtime environment for trustworthy 
applications on a regular personal computer” .  NGSCB 
builds on the TCG specification and a number of 
significant planned modifications to the CPU and chipset 
that have been announced by Intel Inc. under their 
‘LaGrande’  program.  The chipset modifications are 
apparently designed to introduce a trusted path for 
keyboard, mouse and other input, and secure display 
output.  The CPU modifications introduce a new mode 
akin to a ‘ring –1’  and a number of new instructions to 
support it.  The new mode is required for reasons of 
backward compatibility with existing Microsoft 
‘Windows’  operating systems. 
Backward compatibility was stated as a key requirement 
for NGSCB.  As we noted in Section 3.1, the Windows 
kernel, device drivers and operating system operate at the 
highest level of hardware privilege, in ring 0.  Due to the 
untrustworthy bug-prone nature of some operating system 
components and drivers running in this ring, there is no 
way to introduce a “ high assurance runtime environment”  
because there is no tamper resistant space in which to 
implement a domain separation mechanism.  Virtual 
Machine Monitors (VMM), a well understood approach 
to isolating mutually distrusting systems on the same 
CPU are not an option in this case because, according to 
Robin and Irvine, (Robin and Irvine, 2000) the Intel x86 
cannot be securely virtualised.  In the simplest version of 
the VMM approach, multiple operating systems can be 
simultaneously hosted in ring 1 by a VMM that runs in 
ring 0.  The VMM presents the same interface to the 
hosted operating systems as the native hardware and 
provides domain isolation between them.   
Full virtualisation of the x86 chip may not be possible 
but, nonetheless, the type of isolation that NGSCB 
demands requires something roughly equivalent to a 
VMM and a VMM requires a higher level of privilege 
than the hosted operating systems in order to work.  This 
is the reason behind the new mode, ‘ring –1’  that Intel 
announced for their ‘LaGrande’  project.   
Peinado et al., (Peinado et al. 2004) describe the NGSCB 
equivalent of a VMM as an isolation kernel.  The 
isolation kernel protects the memory and device resources 
of a domain from access by other domains.  The isolation 
kernel is not itself a fully featured operating system, it 
merely manages the coexistence of multiple operating 
systems on the same machine.  Again, for reasons of 
backward compatibility, the isolation kernel does not boot 
before the standard Windows operating system and it 
does not run beneath it.  This somewhat unconventional 
approach is a key difference to the TCG style of trusted 
computing, which bases its assurance on an assessment of 
the integrity of the entire boot chain.  NGSCB also takes 
a different tack in not assuming that the BIOS is 
trustworthy.  In a sense, the NGSCB approach has 
abandoned any premise of making the traditional 
Windows operating system ‘trusted’  and opted instead to 
construct a secure environment that can run along side it 
– “ a tight sanctuary on an otherwise bug-prone system”  in 
the words of Peinado et al., (2004).  This tight sanctuary 
can be launched and terminated multiple times in the 
same boot cycle and multiple sanctuaries can 
simultaneously coexist.   
Like TCG, the NGSCB design supports remote 
attestation, and sealed storage.  Unlike the basic version 
of TCG described in the previous section, it supports 
hardware enforced domain isolation and trusted paths.  
As between domains, this is a form of MAC since, once 
activated neither users nor administrators can turn the 
hardware protection off.  Microsoft has asserted that the 
code for the isolation kernel will be sufficiently small and 
simple to provide assurance of its correctness through 
independent evaluation.  Thus NGSCB’ s ‘sanctuary’  
appears to embody the important features that are 
required of a trustworthy computing platform.  However, 
Microsoft has not described in any detail the trusted 
operating system that the isolation kernel actually 
launches – the trusted sanctuary itself.  This sanctuary is 
intended to support multiple applications or ‘applets’  
which do not necessarily trust each other.  Thus an 
operating system capable of the functions described in 
Section 3 will also be required.   
According to Rooney (Rooney, 2004) the future of 
NGSCB is far from certain.  Application developers have 
expressed reluctance to rewrite code to take advantage of 
NGSCB features and Microsoft is reportedly reviewing 
the design to make the task of application integration 
more streamlined.  The impact that this will have on the 
trustworthiness of NGSCB is unclear.  As at the time of 
writing, the Microsoft NGSCB web page states, 
“ Microsoft is currently evolving the NGSCB architecture 
to expand the benefits to customers in terms of 
applicability and flexibility” .  (See: Microsoft, 2004). 
Experience has shown that flexibility tends to undermine 
security, but certainly, no conclusions can be drawn until 
the revised design is clarified.  Rooney notes that 
Microsoft is shifting emphasis to support No Execute 
(NX) technology that has been implemented by Intel in 
its recent processors.  NX allows memory pages to be 
marked as non-executable to limit common attacks that 
exploit buffer overflow.  We note that a strategy based 
purely on NX falls well short of the requirements for 
trusted computing.  It is also worth noting that if the Intel 
segmentation/capability architecture were correctly 
utilised, NX would be unnecessary as a no-execute 
control bit is already available at the segment level.   
6 Conclusion 
We began by emphasizing the importance of trusted 
computing for robust DRM license enforcement.  The 
license validation, interpretation and enforcement 
functions of a DRM client need to implemented within 
the bounds of a trusted computing base.  With reference 
to the early trusted computing literature, we reviewed the 
critical features that define a trusted computing platform.  
Enforcement of a mandatory access control policy, 
observance of the principle of least privilege and 
provision of trusted paths were identified as key 
requirements.  These are absent in mainstream operating 
systems.  For this reason, we argued that such operating 
systems are inappropriate to host DRM client 
applications.  We then analysed the degree to which the 
TCG model of trusted computing can be applied to 
mainstream operating systems to improve their 
trustworthiness.  We concluded that the addition of TCG 
components to such systems does not result in a trusted 
system.  The TCG specification cannot substitute for the 
absence of MAC and the associated domain confinement 
it supports.  We identified specific problems that make 
the TCG features of sealed storage and remote attestation 
impractical when they are used in conjunction with a 
DAC enforcing operating system.  We concluded that the 
TCG specification in conjunction with a MAC enforcing 
operating system may offer a considerably more robust 
platform on which to deploy a DRM client.   
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